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Abstract
Background: Polio eradication is an extraordinary globally coordinated health program in terms of its magnitude
and reach, leading to the elimination of wild poliovirus (WPV) in most parts of the world. In 2013, a silent outbreak
of WPV was detected in Israel, a country using an inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) exclusively since 2005. The
outbreak was detected using environmental surveillance (ES) of sewage reservoirs. Stool surveys indicated the
outbreak to be restricted mainly to children under the age of 10 in the Bedouin population of southern Israel. In
order to curtail the outbreak, a nationwide vaccination campaign using oral polio vaccine (OPV) was conducted,
targeting all children under 10.
Methods: A transmission model, fitted to the results of the stool surveys, with additional conditions set by the ES
measurements, was used to evaluate the prevalence of WPV in Bedouin children and the effectiveness of the
vaccination campaign. Employing the parameter estimates of the model fitting, the model was used to investigate
the effect of alternative timings, coverages and dosages of the OPV campaign on the outcome of the outbreak.
Results: The mean estimate for the mean reproductive number was 1.77 (95 % credible interval, 1.46–2.30). With
seasonal variation, the reproductive number maximum range was between zero and six. The mean estimate for the
mean infectious periods was 16.8 (8.6–24.9) days. The modeling indicates the OPV campaign was effective in curtailing
the outbreak. The mean estimate for the attack rate in Bedouin children under 10 at the end of 2014 was 42 %
(22–65 %), whereas without the campaign the mean projected attack rate was 57 % (35–74 %). The campaign also likely
shortened the duration of the outbreak by a mean estimate of 309 (2–846) days. A faster initiation of the OPV campaign
could have reduced the incidence of WPV even if a lower coverage was reached, at the risk of prolonging the outbreak.
Conclusions: OPV campaigns are essential for interrupting WPV transmission, even in a developed country setting with
a high coverage of IPV. In this setting, establishing ES of WPV circulation is particularly crucial for early detection and
containment of an outbreak.
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Background
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative represents a
major public health challenge. Since 1988, the number
of polio endemic countries had fallen from 125 to just
two (Pakistan and Afghanistan) by September 2015 and
the annual number of wild poliomyelitis cases dropped
to an all-time minimum in 2015 [1]. However, eradica-
tion efforts have been endangered by the reintroduction
of the virus to a number of formerly polio-free countries.
An especially alarming case of reintroduction was the
‘silent outbreak’ in Israel, an inactivated polio vaccine
(IPV)-using country that had been free of wild poliovirus
(WPV) transmission since 1988, and in which transmis-
sion was detected by environmental surveillance (ES) in
the absence of paralytic cases [2, 3]. The first indication
of this outbreak was given on May 28, 2013, by detection
of WPV in a sewage sample taken on April 9, 2013, in
Rahat, a Bedouin town in the southern part of Israel.
Retrospective analysis of sewage samples indicated the ex-
istence of WPV in Israel as early as February 2013 [2, 4].
Sequencing of the virus revealed it to be a wild poliovirus
type 1 (WPV1) related to strains found in Egypt at the
end of 2012 [5]. Following the detection of WPV1, ES was
intensified and stool surveys were conducted in towns
where WPV1 was found in the sewage and other towns in
Israel [4]. This identified additional positive sewage
samples, mainly in the south of Israel, but also in
other locations in the center and the north of Israel
[4]. The stool surveys revealed transmission to be
largely restricted to Bedouin children under the age
of 10 in the affected towns [6].
The focus of transmission among Bedouin towns in
southern Israel may reflect the earlier introduction of
WPV1 into this community, and the facilitation of
transmission by their larger household size and greater
proportion of children in the population (in 2010, 50 %
of the Bedouin population were children under 15, com-
pared to 28 % in Israel as a whole [7]). Life style differ-
ences may also be contributory factors. Concentration
of transmission in children under the age of 10 reflects
their unique vaccination status. In 2005, Israel changed
from a sequential schedule of IPV followed by oral polio
vaccine (OPV) to exclusive use of IPV. OPV induces a
strong gut immunity that limits transmission of the
virus, whereas IPV induces humoral immunity that pro-
tects an individual from the risk of paralysis but has less
impact on viral shedding and hence transmission [8].
However, use of OPV entails a small risk of vaccine-
associated paralytic polio for non-immune recipients or
their contacts [9]. While the initial IPV doses in a
sequential schedule protect recipients from vaccine-as-
sociated paralytic polio, spread of OPV to unvaccinated
contacts still occurs. For this reason, Israel, as well as
other countries that had interrupted WPV transmission,
decided to discontinue use of OPV in their vaccination
programs.
Immediately following the detection of WPV transmis-
sion, the Israeli Ministry of Health launched a nation-
wide IPV catch-up campaign. Two months later, a
national OPV vaccination campaign was launched using
bivalent oral polio vaccine (bOPV) containing types 1
and 3. The campaign began in the south of Israel on
August 5, 2013, targeting all children under 10. Two
weeks later, the campaign was extended to the rest of
Israel. In towns with persistent findings of WPV1 in
sewage, a second round of bOPV vaccination was initi-
ated 2 months later on October 7. The last stool sample
positive for WPV1 was taken on February 19, 2014, and
the last positive indication of WPV1 in sewage was on
April 3, 2014 [10]. By the end of April 2015, the World
Health Organization (WHO) officially declared Israel a
polio-free country [10], following a 12 month period
without any evidence of polio transmission. Throughout
the outbreak, no case of poliomyelitis was reported.
Here we model the transmission of WPV1 in children
under the age of ten in the Bedouin population of south-
ern Israel, the epicenter of the epidemic according to ES.
By fitting a mathematical model to the data collected in
the stool surveys, with conditions set using the results of
ES, we obtain posterior distributions for the model pa-
rameters. Using the model with the estimated parameter
values we reproduce the epidemic dynamics, and evalu-
ate the effectiveness of the OPV campaign. We also in-
vestigate alternative vaccination scenarios with a view to
informing optimal outbreak control measures in other
IPV-using countries that may experience WPV transmis-
sion after an importation.
Methods
Data
Demographic data
The modeled population includes children under 10 in
the Bedouin population of southern Israel that had not
received OPV as part of their routine vaccination sched-
ule prior to the outbreak, together with the newborns
added during the outbreak. According to the Israeli
Ministry of Health records, the number of Bedouin chil-
dren under 10 that were targeted to receive OPV on
October 2013 was 57,882. Using a yearly birth rate of
3.5 % [11, 12] in the total population of approximately
220,000 Bedouins living in the south of Israel in 2013,
we calculated the estimated size of this population
throughout the modeled period (Additional file 1).
Stool survey data
There were two stool surveys. The first survey was con-
ducted during July 2013, prior to the beginning of the
OPV vaccination campaign. The second survey began on
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September 2013, after most of the first doses of OPV
were already given, and continued at a slow rate, up
until June 2014; the sampling procedure has been de-
scribed previously [13]. Briefly, stool samples were ob-
tained from healthy children and infants attending
health care clinics for routine immunizations or health
checks, or attending day care centers. Some samples
were also obtained from stool specimens submitted to
diagnostic laboratories for conditions unrelated to polio,
most of which were from adults. Approximately 17 % of
the stool samples were repeat samples from individuals
who were sampled more than once. We removed all
remaining samples from an individual taken after a first
positive sample and all negative samples from the same
individual taken within 1 month of each other. Testing
other options for treating repeat samples (e.g., leaving all
repeat samples or keeping just the first negative sample
from each individual) demonstrated that this choice had
no material effect on the model output. Altogether, after
removing repeat samples and samples from individuals
above 10, there were 895 samples in the first survey
in the Bedouin population, of which 51 were positive
for WPV1, and 2609 samples in the second survey, of
which 23 were positive. Daily results of the stool
sampling were used in the fitting procedure, as de-
scribed below. These data can be found in their entir-
ety in the supplementary data file (Additional file 2).
The results of the stool surveys within the Bedouin
population in southern Israel revealed no positive sam-
ples (out of a total of 203 samples) in individuals above
the age of 10 (Additional file 1: Figure S1). This result
reaffirmed our assessment that these individuals, who
were vaccinated with OPV in the past, were likely to
have only a minor role in the transmission of WPV1
within the Bedouin community. We therefore focused
on modeling the transmission of WPV1 in children
under the age of 10 that were not vaccinated with OPV
in the past. Within the 0–10 age group, the results of
the stool surveys suggest potentially higher prevalence
rates in the youngest children (Additional file 1: Figure
S1). However, there were no significant differences be-
tween yearly age groups to warrant the partitioning of
the modeled population into several age groups.
Vaccination data
The IPV catch-up campaign increased the coverage of
individuals vaccinated with at least two doses of IPV in
the Bedouin population from 93 % by the beginning of
June 2013 to 97 % by the end of the campaign (unpub-
lished data from the Israeli Ministry of Health), and tar-
geted individuals of all ages, including adults. In order to
simplify our model, we disregarded the negligible por-
tion of individuals not vaccinated with IPV and assumed
the whole population up to age 10 were in the same
vaccination status at the beginning of the epidemic (i.e.,
vaccinated with IPV). The first dose of OPV campaign
began on August 5 and reached a maximum coverage of
90 %. A campaign of a second dose of OPV began on
October 7 and reached coverage of 53 %. Starting from
January 2014, OPV was reintroduced into the routine
vaccination schedule program in Israel, with a first dose
of OPV given at the age of six months and a second dose
a year later (in addition to the IPV vaccinations, which
are given at the age of 2, 4, 6 and 12 months, and an-
other booster at age seven). Coverage of first and second
dose of OPV in the routine vaccination schedule since its
reintroduction is around 90 %. The model incorporates
the number of individuals vaccinated each day with a first
and second dose of OPV in the campaigns or as part of
the routine schedule (see below).
Sewage surveillance data
The first indication of WPV1 transmission was obtained
through ES of sewage in Rahat on the May 28, 2013,
from a sample taken on April 9, 2013. A retrospective
analysis revealed that WPV1 first appeared in the Rahat
sewage in a sample taken on February 6, 2013 [4]. Fol-
lowing the detection of WPV1, ES was intensified to
other locations in Israel, including three more Bedouin
towns in the south of Israel in which continuous ES was
conducted (Ksaifa, Arara and Tel Sheva). The last posi-
tive indication of WPV1 in the sewage of any of these
towns was on April 3, 2014 [10]. While there is a quanti-
tative aspect to the sewage sampling results (in terms of
the number of viral plaque-forming units or WPV1
qRT-PCR cycle threshold values [4]), there is currently
no known method to relate these quantities to the
prevalence of WPV1 in the sampled community. How-
ever, the sewage sampling data was employed in two
ways in the model fitting procedure: (1) by helping to set
an upper limit for the initiation time of the epidemic
(Additional file 1) and (2) by filtering out unrealistic
model simulations which qualitatively contradict the re-
sults of the sewage sampling (see ‘Inference’ section).
Transmission model
A deterministic, discrete-time, susceptible (S)→ exposed
(E)→ infectious (I)→ recovered (R) transmission model
was used to model the transmission of WPV1 in the
population (Fig. 1). In this model, individuals who have
been vaccinated with IPV but not OPV lack intestinal
immunity and are susceptible to WPV1 infection and,
on exposure, can enter the latent period before becom-
ing infectious and finally recovering. Since the transmis-
sion of poliovirus is known to be seasonal [14], the
reproductive number (a key epidemiological parameter
that summarizes the epidemic potential of an infectious
disease in a given population [15]) is modeled using a
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periodic function with three parameters: R – the mean
reproductive number, δ – the amplitude of the seasonal
variation in transmission and ϕ – the peak time of trans-
mission. The shape of the periodic function was obtained
using the results of a study modeling the transmission of
WPV in the US during the pre-vaccination era [16], by
taking the mean of the estimated seasonal variation in the
10 southern US states that share the same latitudes with
Israel (30–33 N) (see Additional file 1 for a full description
of the transmission model).
Vaccination
The model incorporates the number of individuals vacci-
nated with a first and second dose of OPV on day t, dur-
ing the two vaccination campaigns and the new routine
vaccination program. The vaccinations in the model are
protective after a week, as this is the time it takes for the
vaccine to build up protective intestinal immunity [17].
The model assumes a per-dose efficacy ρ, which implies
that an IPV vaccinated individual who is susceptible to
infection either becomes completely protected from in-
fection with WPV1 on receipt of a dose of OPV or that
the vaccine fails to build protective intestinal immunity
after that dose (as in [18–20], for example). For a realis-
tic representation of the effect of OPV on protection
against infection the model distinguishes between three
susceptible compartments (Fig. 1). The S1 compartment
includes individuals who were not vaccinated with OPV,
while S2 and S3 include individuals vaccinated with one
and two doses of OPV, respectively, for which the vac-
cine has failed to produce effective immunity. Since the
vaccines were given to individuals without knowledge of
their actual immune state, some vaccines were given to
individuals who were already protected (through
infection with WPV1). The model accounts for the
probability that a first (second) dose of OPV given on
day t is given to a susceptible individual from the S1
(S2) compartment. These probabilities were calculated
according to the fraction of the susceptible individuals
within the target population for each dose of OPV on
day t (see Additional file 1 for more details). Secondary
infections with OPV were not included in the model as,
with the high vaccine coverage and the restricted trans-
mission capacity of vaccine virus compared to wild virus
[21], their effect would be negligible.
Inference
The results of the stool sampling provide estimates for
the prevalence of infection of WPV1 in the population.
A stochastic observation model was used to link the
prevalence given by the transmission model to the stool
survey data, from which a likelihood function was de-
rived, describing the probability of observing the stool
survey data given a set of values for the model parame-
ters (see Additional file 1 for details). In addition, the
information available from ES was employed in the like-
lihood function by setting to zero the likelihood of par-
ameter values leading to simulations in which the
estimated prevalence after June 2014 (2 months after the
last positive findings of WPV in the sewage) was
higher than the estimated prevalence during February
6, 2013 (the initial detection time of WPV in the
sewage), since higher prevalence after June 2014
would have led to positive findings in the sewage (see
Additional file 1 for details).
Altogether, the transmission model employs five pa-
rameters with unknown values (Table 1): the mean
duration of infectiousness (dI), the mean reproductive
Fig. 1 Diagram describing the transmission model compartments. The solid arrows denote the transitions related to infection with wild polio
virus. The dashed arrows denote transitions related to vaccination with oral polio vaccine (OPV). The dotted arrow entering the group S1 denotes
births. Individuals in the population can be in one of four general states: susceptible (S), exposed (E), infectious (I) or recovered (R). In addition,
susceptible individuals are divided into three groups: S1 includes individuals that did not yet receive OPV, S2 includes individuals that received
one dose of OPV but remained susceptible, and S3 includes individuals that received two doses of OPV but remained susceptible
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number (R ), the amplitude (δ) and the peak time (ϕ)
of the seasonal variation in the transmission and the
efficacy of the OPV vaccine (ρ). In addition, there is
one unknown initial condition which is the initiation
time of the epidemic (t0) (i.e., the introduction time
of the first infected case into the population). Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) was used to sample the
posterior distribution for the model parameters, de-
fined by the likelihood function and priors, according
to the Bayesian methodology [22]. The prior distribu-
tions used for the parameters are given in Table 1.
The priors for the two seasonality parameters (δ and
ϕ), were set using a normal distribution with the
mean and standard deviation of the amplitudes and
peak times of the seasonal variation in the 10 south-
ern US states from which the shape of the seasonal
function was obtained (Table 1 and Additional file 1).
The prior for the per-dose efficacy of OPV (ρ) was
set using a normal distribution with the estimated
mean and standard deviation given in [23]. Parameter
values sampled using MCMC were employed with the
transmission model in order to obtain 95 % credible
intervals (CI) for WPV1 prevalence during the out-
break, as well as the posterior distribution for the
overall attack rate and end time of the outbreak.
Results
Figure 2 shows the posterior distributions obtained for
the model parameters and Table 2 gives the summary sta-
tistics for these distributions. The posterior distribution of
the mean duration of infection (dI) was calculated to have
a mean of 16.8 days (95 % CI, 8.6–24.9). The posterior dis-
tribution of the mean reproductive number ( R ) has a
mean of 1.77 (1.46–2.30). The mean peak time of the sea-
sonal variation in transmission (ϕ) was found to be May
18 (April 1–August 3), earlier than the estimated mean
peak time of June 5 in the 10 southern US states that were
used to construct the prior for ϕ. The posterior distribu-
tion of the amplitude of the seasonal variation (δ) was also
found to shift left relative to the prior distribution, indicat-
ing higher probabilities for a smaller amplitude than the
estimated mean in the 10 southern US states. The
posterior distribution of the per-dose vaccine efficacy
of OPV (ρ) was found to shift right relative to the
prior distribution with a mean of 0.63 compared to
0.56 in the prior. Regarding the initiation time of the
outbreak (t0), no real information could be inferred
from the data, as the whole considered range of
values was found to be almost evenly likely.
Figure 3 shows the estimated 95 % CI of WPV1
prevalence in the modeled population during the out-
break and its fit to the stool sample data. The figure
shows a good fit between the estimated prevalence
and the weekly smoothing of the stool data. Accord-
ing to the results of the model fit, the outbreak
peaked during the middle of August 2013, immedi-
ately after the campaign of the first dose of OPV had
begun. However, there is considerable uncertainty re-
garding the prevalence at the peak of the outbreak, as
this is the time between the two stool surveys in
which no stool sample data is available. According to
the fit, the campaign for the second dose of OPV,
which began two months after the first dose cam-
paign, took place when the outbreak was largely over.
Together with the low coverage reached in this cam-
paign (max. 53 %) it is therefore no surprise that the
model estimates that this campaign had little effect
Table 1 List of the transmission model parameters
Parameter Meaning Value/prior distribution Source/ref
N Modeled population sizea From 49,692 on September 15, 2012,
to 67,248 on December 31, 2014b
(Additional file 1: Figure S2)
Israeli Ministry of Health [11, 12]
dL Mean duration of latent period 4 days [35, 36]
dI Mean duration of infectious period U (7,49) days [8, 25–30]
R Mean reproductive number U (1,10) [37]
δ Amplitude of seasonal variation in transmissionc N (1,0.414)d [16]
ϕ Peak day of seasonal transmission N (156,17.55)d [16]
ρ Per-dose efficacy of OPV N (0.56,0.23) [23]
t0 Initiation time of the outbreak U (Sep 15, 2012 to Feb 6, 2013)
e [4, 5]
aThe number of children under 10 in the Bedouin population of southern Israel that were not vaccinated with OPV as part of their routine vaccination schedule
prior to the outbreak (including children born after the initiation of the outbreak)
bBased on available data from the Israeli Ministry of Health for October 2013 and extended for the whole time period using a birth rate of 3.5 % and a population
size of 220,000 for the whole Bedouin population in southern Israel on 2013 (see Additional file 1 for details)
cDefined using the normalized mean seasonal variation estimated across 10 southern US states during the pre-vaccine era, so that δ = 0 means no seasonal
variation while δ = 1 means seasonal variation equal to the normalized mean seasonal variation of the southern US states (see Additional file 1 for details)
dBased on the variance in the estimates of the seasonal variation in 10 southern US states during the pre-vaccine era (see Additional file 1 for details)
eBased on the results of a phylogenetic analysis and the initial finding of WPV1 using ES (see Additional file 1 for details)
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on the outbreak dynamics (with only the first dose of
OPV the model projects similar results to those obtained
with the two dose campaign (results not shown)).
Figure 4a presents the estimated 95 % CI of WPV1
prevalence with and without the OPV campaign up to
the end of 2014 (middle panel). The projections for the
prevalence without the OPV campaign were obtained by
using the same parameter values given by the MCMC
sampling, while removing the OPV vaccinations from
the model. Without the vaccination campaign the model
projects a possible second epidemic wave taking place
during 2014. This second wave is a result of the season-
ality in the transmission of WPV1 (Fig. 4a top panel),
with the replenishment of the susceptible population
due to births a possible contributing factor. In simula-
tions without seasonality there is only a single epidemic
but the outbreak is projected to continue for longer
than it would have with the OPV campaign (Fig. 4a
bottom panel, see also Additional file 1: Figure S8
and Additional file 1: Table S1). The possibility of no
seasonality cannot be ruled out from the results of
the model fitting, as apparent by the 95 % CI of δ,
which includes zero (Table 2). In addition, a comparison
of the models with seasonality and without seasonality
using deviation inference criterion [24] shows no prefer-
ence for any of the models (Additional file 1: Table S2).
Figures 4b,c show the posterior distributions for the
attack rate at the end of 2014 and the end time of the
outbreak (set as the time when incidence in the trans-
mission model drops below one infected individual) with
and without the OPV campaign (see also Table 2). The
mean estimate for the attack rate is 42 % (22–65 %),
whereas without the OPV campaign the model projects
a mean attack rate of 57 % (35–74 %). The model esti-
mates the end time of the outbreak to be around April
12, 2014 (January 19, 2014, to October 8, 2014). This es-
timate is in accordance with the results of the ES (Fig. 3
top panel), which is of no surprise as these results were
used as part of the inference scheme. When removing
the condition related to the results of ES from the infer-
ence scheme, the model allows for some scenarios in
which a small second epidemic wave occurs during the
Fig. 2 Posterior distributions obtained for the model parameters using MCMC: a Posterior distribution for the mean reproductive number. b
Posterior distribution for the mean infectious period. c Posterior distribution for the amplitude of seasonal variation in transmission. The red curve
shows the prior distribution based on the variation in the amplitude in 10 southern US states (Table 1 and Additional file 1). The posterior
distribution is shifted left from the prior distribution with a mean of 0.57 compared to a mean of 1 in the prior distribution. d Posterior distribution for
the peak time of seasonal variation in transmission. The red curve shows the prior distribution based on the variation in the peak time in 10 southern
US states (Table 1 and Additional file 1). The posterior distribution is shifted left from the prior distribution, with a mean peak day of 138 (May 18)
compared to a mean of 156 (June 5) in the prior distribution. e Posterior distribution for the per-dose efficacy of OPV. The red curve shows the prior
distribution based on [23] (Table 1). The posterior distribution is shifted right from the prior distribution, with a mean efficacy of 0.63 compared to a
mean of 0.56 in the prior distribution. f Posterior distribution for the start time of the outbreak
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summer of 2014 (Additional file 1: Figure S10). Without
the OPV campaign the model estimates the outbreak
could have lasted until November 2016. As a sensitivity
test, we recalculated the posterior distribution for the
end time of the outbreak when increasing the threshold
for extinction to 10 infected individuals (Additional file
1: Figure S11). Using this threshold there is still consid-
erable probability that the outbreak without the OPV
campaign would have lasted up to February 2015, but
only a very small probability it would have lasted for lon-
ger than that. This indicates that stochastic fade-outs of
the outbreak during periods of low transmission (which
are not accounted for in the deterministic transmission
model), are not likely to have prevented the second wave
during 2014 but are more likely to have prevented any
additional waves after that.
Using the model, we investigated what would have
been the effect of different OPV campaigns on the out-
break in terms of the overall incidence and the outbreak
duration. We explored the effects of the timing of the
vaccination, comparing three alternatives for the start of
the campaign: April 5, 2013 – two months after the first
indication of WPV1 using ES in retrospect; June 5, 2013
– a week after the outbreak was actually detected; and
Fig. 3 Top panel: Results of the ES. Red line indicates a positive finding of WPV1 in one of the four relevant sites (see ‘Methods’). Green line indicates
no positive findings. Data shown here is up to the end of April 2014, after which there were no positive findings of WPV1 in any sewage sample.
Bottom panel: The fit of the model to the stool samples data. The grey area marks the estimated 95 % credible interval of WPV1 prevalence in the
modeled population of Bedouin children. The yellow area within the grey area presents a more restricted estimated range of WPV1 prevalence using
parameter values whose log-likelihood is within 2 log-likelihood units of the best fit (a commonly used threshold for selection of the more probable fits
to the data [34]). The blue x marks the proportion of stool samples positive for WPV1 in each of the days that samples were collected. The magenta
dots present a weekly smoothing of the sampled data. For a description of the smoothing and the confidence intervals related to the stochasticity of
the observation of the stool data see Figure S7 in Additional file 1. While the likelihood was calculated using the non-smoothed stool sample data, the
smoothed data captures the trend of the estimated prevalence better, as it blends in the effect of days with zero positive samples, of which there were
many in the second stool survey due to the low number of samples taken each day. The red lines show the cumulative vaccine coverage (right y-axis)
of the first (solid line) and second (dashed line) OPV doses in the modeled population
Table 2 Selected results of the model fitting
Output Mean (95 % CI)
Mean reproductive number 1.77 (1.46–2.30)
Mean duration of the infectious period 16.8 days (8.6–24.9)
Amplitude of seasonal variation in
transmission
0.57 (0–1.74)
Peak day of seasonal variation in
transmission
138 (91–215)
May 18 (Apr 1 to Aug 3)
Per-dose efficacy of oral polio
vaccine (OPV)
0.63 (0–1)
Attack rate at the end of 2014
with the OPV campaign
0.42 (0.22–0.65)
Attack rate at the end of 2014
without the OPV campaign
0.57 (0.35–0.74)
Reduction in attack rate due to
OPV campaign
0.15 (0–0.40)
End time of the outbreak with
the OPV campaign
April 12, 2014
(Jan 19, 2014, to Oct 8, 2014)
End time of the outbreak without
the OPV campaign
February 15, 2015
(Feb 18, 2014, to Nov 12, 2016)
Reduction in outbreak duration
due to OPV campaign
309 days (2–846)
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August 5, 2013 – the time the vaccination campaign ac-
tually began. We also explored three possible vaccine
coverage scenarios (50 %, 70 % and 90 %) and two dos-
age scenarios (one dose vs. two doses). The vaccinations
were set so that the target coverage was reached within
a month of the start date, after which vaccinations were
set to maintain the same coverage with the growing
population. When modeling the effect of two doses it
was assumed the coverage for the second dose is the
same as for the first dose and that the second dose is
given two weeks after the first dose. For each tested sce-
nario, we ran the model for a period of five years using
the 95 % best fitting parameter values given by the
MCMC and calculated the mean and 95 % CI of the cu-
mulative incidence and outbreak durations. For this ex-
ercise, the end time of the outbreak was set to when the
incidence in the transmission model drops below 10 in-
fected individuals, in order to take into account the
Fig. 4 a Top panel: 1000 plots of the value of the reproductive number (R) in time, calculated using Eq. S2 and S4 in Additional file 1 with 1000 values
of R, δ and ϕ, randomly sampled out of the values obtained by the MCMC. The range includes plots with no or weak seasonal variation in which R ¼ R
e1:8 (blue curves showing results for δ≤ 0.1), plots with strong seasonal variation in which R varies from a minimum of close to zero during winter to a
maximum of around six during late spring – early summer (red curves showing results for δ≥ 1) and everything in between (green curves). Middle
panel: 95 % CI of WPV1 prevalence with the oral polio vaccine (OPV) campaign (dark grey) and without the OPV campaign (light grey). Bottom Panel:
The outcome without the OPV campaign (light grey area in middle panel) depends on the estimated strength of the seasonality. The dashed blue lines
depict a subset range of the prevalence without the OPV campaign obtained using weak or no seasonality (δ≤ 0.1), while the red dotted-dashed lines
show a subset range of prevalence without the OPV campaign obtained using strong seasonality (δ≥ 1.0). The range obtained using weak seasonality
consists of a single long wave, with a tail possibly extending into the first half of 2014, whereas the range obtained using strong seasonality consists of a
shorter wave in 2013, with the possibility of a second wave during the second half of 2014. b The posterior distribution of the overall attack rate at the
end of 2014 with (dark grey bars) and without (light grey bars) the OPV campaign. c The posterior distribution for the end time of the outbreak showing
the probability of the outbreak ending on a particular month with (dark grey bars) and without (light grey bars) the OPV campaign. With the campaign
the model estimates the outbreak ended sometime between January 2014 and October 2014. Without the OPV campaign the model projects the
outbreak could have lasted until November 2016 (Table 2)
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probability of a stochastic fade-out of the outbreak dur-
ing the periods of low transmissibility.
Figure 5 summarizes the results of this examination. As
expected, the cumulative incidence dropped considerably
when the vaccinations were performed earlier in the epi-
demic (Fig. 5a). A vaccination campaign starting in June
would have likely been more effective in reducing the inci-
dence of WPV1 than a campaign starting in August, even
if the coverage reached in June would have been just 50 %
compared to 90 % in August. This would indicate that
starting the vaccination campaign as early as possible
should be a primary goal even at the risk of obtaining a re-
duced coverage. However, the obtained outbreak duration
for the different scenarios (Fig. 5b) revealed a conflicting
trend. By vaccinating early while not reaching a high
enough vaccine coverage, it is possible to actually prolong
the outbreak. According to the results shown in Fig. 5b,
vaccinating only 50 % of the population with a single dose
in June could have resulted in an outbreak lasting for
around three years, whereas with vaccination starting in
August and reaching 90 % coverage, maximum outbreak
duration would be of approximately two years. This effect
is even more pronounced had vaccination begun earlier,
on April 2013, in which case with coverage of 50 % the
epidemic could have lasted for five years and more. The
effect is easy to understand in epidemic modeling terms:
an early vaccination campaign reaching a coverage that is
not high enough to reduce the reproductive number to
below unity while leaving a large enough susceptible pool
in the population, would lead to a slowly progressing epi-
demic that would infect only a small proportion of the
population but could take a long time to die out (see also
Additional file 1: Figure S12). Secondary infections with
OPV (which were not accounted for in the model) might
reduce this effect to some extent. Early vaccination could
result in wider dissemination of OPV as there would be
more susceptible individuals in the population. Neverthe-
less, the increase in OPV coverage through secondary in-
fections should be small due to the reduced transmission
capacity of the vaccine virus [21].
With regards to the number of doses, the results pre-
sented in Fig. 5 demonstrate that the benefits gained by
a second dose of OPV would depend on the timing of
the campaign and the coverage reached. When the
Fig. 5 The effect of alternative OPV campaign scenarios on the cumulative incidence of the outbreak (a) and the outbreak duration (b). The
outbreak duration was defined as the time when the incidence in the model drops below 10 infected individuals in order to take into account
the probability of a stochastic fade-out of the outbreak during the periods of low transmissibility. Color bars show the mean and error bars show
the 95 % CI obtained for each scenario by running the model using the 95 % best fitting parameter values given by the MCMC simulation. The
simulations were run for up to five years
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coverage reached for the first dose is not high enough to
mitigate the epidemic, the second dose of OPV could be
instrumental in increasing the immunity in the popula-
tion to the levels needed to stop the epidemic and redu-
cing the risk of a prolonged epidemic. The earlier in the
epidemic the vaccination starts, the greater the effective-
ness of the second dose of OPV would be. When vaccin-
ation starts late in the epidemic, the susceptible pool in
the population would already be reduced, so that the
coverage needed to mitigate the epidemic would be
smaller and the effect of a second dose would also be re-
duced. With the campaign starting at the actual time it
did (August 2013), the model indicates that the effect of
the second dose of OPV would have been limited, even
under a more optimal scenario in which anyone that re-
ceives a first dose receives a second dose two weeks
later.
Discussion
In this work, an epidemic transmission model was fitted
to the unique stool sample data collected during the re-
introduction of poliovirus to Israel. The inclusion of a
condition set according to information gathered by ES
helped to reduce uncertainty in the results of the model
fitting (Additional file 1: Figure S9–S10 and Additional file
1: Table S3). To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at
estimating the dynamics of a silent transmission of polio-
virus using such data. Using MCMC we obtained the pos-
terior distributions for the model parameters (Fig. 2 and
Table 2). The results of the model fitting suggest the out-
break had peaked during August 2013, after the initiation
of the first dose of the OPV campaign, and had ended
around April 2014 (Fig. 3 and Table 2). The results also in-
dicate that the OPV vaccination campaign was most likely
effective in curtailing the WPV1 transmission, both redu-
cing the overall attack rate and shortening the duration of
the outbreak (Fig. 4 and Table 2).
Our estimates for the reproductive number with max-
imum seasonal variation range between zero and six
(Fig. 4a, top panel). As we model the transmission of
WPV1 within an IPV vaccinated population, these values
might not be similar to the values of the reproductive
number in a completely susceptible population (known
as the basic reproductive number – R0). The relationship
between the reproductive number in our settings and
the reproductive number in a naïve population depends
on the protective effect of IPV in terms of its ability to
reduce poliovirus transmission. One such suggested pro-
tective effect of IPV is shortening of the infectious
period [25–27]. Our estimates of the mean infectious
period in the range of 8–25 days are considerably
shorter than the estimated range of 28–49 days in naïve
populations [28–30], which may serve as support for
such claims. If IPV does shorten the period of infection,
then the value of the reproductive number in a naïve
population should be higher than our estimates, as the
reproductive number is proportional to the mean infec-
tious period (Additional file 1: Eq. S2).
The modeling suggests that the late initiation of the
OPV campaign reduced its effectiveness (Fig. 5). The
two months between the first identification of the
WPV1 using ES and the initiation of the OPV campaign
were used by the Israeli Ministry of Health to validate
the likely prevalence of infection and determine the epi-
center of transmission (through the first stool survey),
and to prepare for the campaign, which included the ac-
quisition of the bOPV stockpiles and the organization of
a communication effort, targeting both physicians and
the general public, in order to increase the public trust
in the vaccination campaign and achieve higher vaccin-
ation coverage [10]. Balancing speed of response against
achieving high coverage is a dilemma that decision
makers face in the event of a polio outbreak. Moreover,
we show that the effectiveness of the outbreak control
measures can be assessed using different criteria, namely
overall incidence or outbreak duration, which adds an-
other layer of complexity. An early vaccination campaign
with a low to medium coverage could have significantly
reduced the incidence of WPV1 at the cost of possibly
prolonging the outbreak by a significant measure (Fig. 5).
The duration of an outbreak is especially important
when considering global polio eradication efforts. In a
long outbreak, the probability of exporting cases to other
locations can increase. In addition, a country faces the
risk of being labeled a re-established transmission coun-
try if there is evidence for WPV transmission over a
year, despite no paralytic cases.
In Israel, decision-makers also faced a second dilemma
of whether to use a single or two doses of OPV in the
campaign. A multi-dose vaccination campaign has sev-
eral drawbacks compared to a single dose campaign.
The main concern in Israel was that multi-dose vaccin-
ation will achieve lower public acceptance compared to
a single dose campaign, which would lead to lower over-
all vaccine coverage (in fact, the coverage of the second
OPV dose reached only 53 %). In addition, a multi-dose
campaign would have further exhausted the public
health resources necessary for maintaining the routine
vaccination schedule in Israel. With the 90 % coverage
achieved with the first dose of OPV, the model showed
that the second dose had almost no impact on transmis-
sion. Even under an optimal outbreak response scenario
(two doses given two weeks apart starting as soon as
transmission was detected) the second dose would have
had limited impact (Fig. 5). A second dose would have
had bigger impact if vaccination had begun even earlier
(assuming earlier detection) and if the first dose cover-
age had been lower. Obviously, the importance of a
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second dose (and third and fourth doses) is greater in
populations in which the efficacy of OPV is low, since in
these populations even a high coverage of a single dose
of OPV might not be enough to reach the levels of pro-
tection necessary to prevent an epidemic. Given the
challenges in achieving high coverage in some other newly
infected countries, multi-dose campaigns, which also offer
additional opportunities for vaccinating children who
missed the first dose, are more beneficial and make an im-
portant contribution to global polio eradication efforts.
Our model focuses on the transmission among chil-
dren under the age of 10, the birth cohorts that received
only IPV as part of their routine vaccination schedule
and in whom all the positive stool samples were found.
While there may have been some transmission in older
OPV-vaccinated age groups in whom mucosal immunity
had waned, there was no indication for that in the stool
samples gathered in the Bedouin population (no posi-
tives among 203 stool samples from ≥10 year olds – see
Additional file 1: Figure S1). We acknowledge the possi-
bility that older children and adults have a potential to
play a role in the transmission of the disease. The model
also does not take into account any spatial dynamics for
which spread between disparate communities by adults
may play a role. As in any study attempting to make in-
ference by fitting a model to data, there was a need to
balance model complexity with the ability to estimate
the model parameters, which is limited by the availability
and the quantity and quality of the data. Unfortunately,
this limited our ability to investigate important issues
such as waning immunity in the older age groups and
their potential role in the spatial and temporal spread of
the epidemic. It would be interesting to consider more
complex models in future theoretical modeling studies
or in any future outbreaks that generate more detailed
age and geographically stratified stool sample data.
Conclusions
The Israeli experience illustrates the importance of OPV
in interrupting WPV transmission, even in a developed
country setting with a very high coverage of IPV. While
the larger family size and more crowed living conditions in
the Bedouin community may have facilitated WPV trans-
mission in this population, there was no evidence of trans-
mission despite importations into the West Bank and
Gaza, where conditions are similar but a sequential IPV/
OPV schedule is used [31]. The fact that transmission
within the Bedouin population of southern Israel was
mostly limited to children below 10 (i.e., individuals vacci-
nated with IPV only) further illustrates the consequences
of the loss of the mucosal immunity induced by OPV. Fol-
lowing the switch from tOPV to bOPV in April 2016 [21],
the population immunity to type 2 poliovirus will, in time,
drop below the required herd immunity level and, in such
a situation, reintroduction of WPV2, or the more likely
scenario of emergence of a circulating vaccine derived
strain, can initiate an epidemic. The WHO Strategic
Advisory Group of Experts has recommended that the
outbreak response in such an event requires the use of
monovalent OPV type 2 to generate mucosal immunity
and interrupt transmission [32]. Our experience and mod-
eling provides evidence in support of this view and can be
used to develop optimal vaccination policies in case of
future reintroductions of the virus.
The Israeli experience also highlights the importance
of environmental surveillance for the early detection of
poliovirus transmission, especially in countries with high
IPV vaccine coverage. In Israel, had there only been
acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance, the probability
of detecting the outbreak early would have been low and
would only have occurred after the devastating conse-
quence of a paralytic case; transmission could have gone
unnoticed in the absence of a paralytic case or with im-
perfect AFP surveillance. Early detection of poliovirus
transmission using ES is now an essential component of
the global polio eradication strategy, which, in 2016, en-
tered a new phase with the withdrawal of OPV2 [33].
The outbreak in Israel demonstrates that the introduction
of IPV to mitigate the consequences of an emergence of a
circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus will have a limited
effect on transmission by itself. However, establishing ES
will allow early initiation of outbreak response measures
which, combined with the protection afforded by IPV
against paralysis, will reduce the burden of AFP.
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